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Abstract   A bioeconomic simulation model of the Ivorian sardinella fishery is
developed to identify and quantify welfare effects stemming from resource ex-
ploitation controlled by a fishermen’s monopoly. The biological and economic
components are modeled to include multicohorts and multispecies, the demand
facing the industrial sector, and a heterogeneous fishing fleet under exploitation
conditions with and without cycles. A profit maximization scenario indicates
that management of the fishery under the current fleet structure is not socially
optimal. The analysis is extended to include the competition from an expanding
artisanal sector of the fishery. Any changes in public policies leading to the ex-
pansion of the artisanal fishery would result in increases in consumer benefits
from the fishery, while the benefits to the syndicate decrease.
Key words   Artisanal, bioeconomic, cycles, sardinella fishery, social optimum,
syndicate.
Introduction
The principal objective of this paper is to evaluate the welfare implications of mar-
ket concentration in the exploitation of renewable resources. Few theoretical studies
have addressed this issue in the case of the exploitation of a fishery under an imper-
fect competition (Clark and Munro 1980; Stollery 1987; and Hannesson 1985).
As expected, such market organizations lead to the distortion of the resource al-
location and the loss of economic efficiency. Clark and Munro (1980) and Stollery
(1987) analyzed the effects of a monopsony processor in the fishing industry. They
demonstrated that the extent of the resource conservation in this case depends on
both the speed of entry or exit in the harvesting sector and the discount rate. On the
other hand, Hannesson (1985) examined the effects of a fishermen’s monopoly in
the market and found that such market organization would be efficient if aggregate
benefits of fishermen are maximized, processed fish are exported, marginal process-
ing costs are constant, and the costs of harvesting for the fishermen’s monopoly are
identical to the social cost.
The current market structure of the Ivorian sardinella industry, i.e., the existence
of catch quotas and restricted entry in the industrial sector of the fishery, has
prompted concerns of policy makers. There appears to be serious concern whether
this market structure should be modified to allow for more industrial production. An
obvious related question is whether to expand the artisanal sector of the fishery.
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Background
The development of the sardinella fishery goes back to the early sixties, when indus-
trial vessels accounted for the predominant portion of the commercial landings of
small pelagic species. The fishery then underwent changes during the seventies and
early eighties. First, the stocks of Sardinella aurita and Scomber japonicus col-
lapsed in 1973–1974 as a result of increased fishing effort and catch of juveniles
(Orstom 1976). Second, a cartel created by the industrial vessel owners has control
over production by setting a maximum number of vessels which can land on any day
and using quotas in order to achieve high and more stable prices (Direction des
Pêches 1983). Third, the marine artisanal fishery began developing rapidly with the
harvesting of sardinella resources in the inshore waters of Côte d’Ivoire. Whereas
the number of industrial vessels decreased from thirty-four to sixteen during the pe-
riod 1966–1982, the number of artisanal boats increased substantially. Despite the
exploitation of the resource by the two sectors of the fishery, the supply of
sardinella is highly seasonal due to the intensity of the upwelling. Landings peak be-
tween July and November and are generally at their lowest in the months of May
and June. These fluctuations are caused by strong or weak upwelling.
The sardinella fishery has been a major contributor to the total landings in Côte
d’Ivoire. While the commercial fleet accounted for almost 82% of the industrial
catches in 1986, the artisanal fleet represented at least 30% of the landings of marine
artisanal fishery (Direction des Pêches 1986). On the consumption side, about 50% of
all animal protein consumed in Côte d’Ivoire comes from fish (FAO 1991). Per capita
consumption, estimated at 24.1 kg in 1982, is expected to exceed 24 kg between 1985–
2000 as a result of an increase in population by 3.8% annually on average (Reizer
1984). As one of the lower priced fish, sardinella is the main source of animal pro-
tein for low income families, urban as well as rural (Konan and Bard 1986).
Applied Model
For the purposes of bioeconomic modeling, the Ivorian sardinella fishery was di-
vided into two components. The first component is modeled in terms of the predic-
tive and population dynamics approach. In the economic submodel, the emphasis is
placed on fleet composition, cost structure of the representative vessels, and the de-
mand facing the syndicate.
The Biological Submodel
The biological submodel for the multiyear classes is adapted to a Ricker model
(1975). This model simulates the dynamics of cohorts of fish by calculating changes
in biomass due to changes in numbers of individuals within a cohort through natural
and fishing mortality, as well as the change in biomass due to growth of individuals
within the cohort. It is assumed that juvenile sardinella species are introduced into
the model at the predetermined rates so that the estimated catches approximate the
pattern of actual catches. Parameters used in this model are from the literature.
The dynamics of individuals within a particular age class are described as:
Nt = R ∗  e–(M+F)(t–tρ ) (1)
where Nt is the number of individuals within an age class at time t, R is the recruit-Economic Impact of the Ivorian Sardinella Fishery 33
ment, M is the natural mortality rate, F is the fishing mortality rate, and tρ  is the age
at which recruits become liable to harvest.
The weight of the individual fish within a particular cohort at time t, Wt, is de-
scribed by Von Bertalanffy organic function:
Wt = W∞ [1 – e–K(t–t0)]3 (2)
where K is the brody growth, W∞  is the asymptotic weight of the fish if fishermen
did not catch it, and t0 is the theoretical age at which weight is zero. Hence, the bio-
mass of a particular cohort at time t, B(t), is defined as:
Bit = NtWt (3)
The fishable biomass of a species i at time t, FBMSit, is given by:







The total fishing mortality for any species i at time t, Fit, is presumed proportional to
the fishing effort of all vessels j, Eijt, by the catchability coefficient, qij, so that






∗  Eijt (5)
Following the bioeconomics literature, the total catch of species i at time t, Qit, is
determined by:
Qit = Fi ∗  FBMSit (6)
However, the integral part of this research is also the examination of variations
in landings and prices. As indicated in previous sections, fluctuations in temperature
(upwelling) are of critical importance to biomass, and it is essential that the above
model considers these fluctuations in assessing management strategies. The deter-
ministic version of the model with fluctuations is derived as follows. Recruitment
will be assumed to fluctuate as observed in landings by introducing harmonic terms.
This is done by using the harmonic approach which consists of entering time in ei-
ther the sine or cosine function (or both) into the model (Bireley 1985; Waugh and
Miller 1958):
Rf = R + a ∗  [sin(t), cos(t)] (7)
where Rf is the recruitment with fluctuations, and a is the amplitude of the fluctua-
tion in the recruitment (i.e., a is a fraction of R). Thus equation 6 becomes
Qit = Fi ∗   FBMSit
f (8)
where  FBMSit
f  is the fishable biomass with fluctuations. As a result, the model is al-
lowed to fluctuate in a manner described by the historical data.Diaby 34
The Economic Submodel
The industrial sardinella fleet in 1986 was grouped into two homogeneous classes to
reflect differences in vessel size, horsepower, fishing power, fishing mortality, and
operating cost. The two primary classes are: class 1 with eleven small vessels for an
average of 240 horsepower and class 2 involving five large vessels with an average
450 horsepower. Calculation of the catchability coefficients is designated to relate
to: (1) vessel characteristics; (2) different sardinella species; (3) and percentage of
the sardinella population exposed to fishing pressure.
Estimates of the fishing mortality applied by each vessel class are derived from the
total catch and mortality by species. It is assumed that the three fishing mortalities come
from these two classes except for Brachydeuterus auritus and the fishing mortality ap-
plied to each species by each vessel class is identical to the percentage contribution of








where Fij is the relative fishing mortality applied to species i by vessel class j, Qij is
the catch of species i by vessel class j, Qi is the total catch of species i by both
classes, and Fi is the total fishing mortality applied to species i.
Using fishing mortalities from the above equation, the catchability coefficients







However, the resulting catchability coefficients did not take into account variability
in these coefficients due to abundance and the relative fishing effort targeted to each
species. Because separate estimates of fishing time directed at each species are not
available, catchability coefficients cannot be specified empirically.
The cost structure of the Ivorian sardinella fishery is not well documented.
However, estimates of costs and earnings of representative vessels of the fishery in
1983 were evaluated by Frielink (1987). As inquiries to vessel companies did not
yield any positive answers, the 1983 costs were used for this study. Therefore, some
of these costs components were adjusted in order to get reasonable estimates. Fish-
ing vessels have two types of costs: (1) fixed costs that include insurance, port
taxes, depreciation, financial costs, opportunity costs, and miscellaneous costs; and,
(2) variable costs associated with fuel and lubrification, ice, fishing materials, re-
pairs and maintenance, unloading costs, and crew costs. The total cost is assumed to
be a non-linear function of the level of fishing effort (E). Therefore, total cost for
vessel representative of each class is defined as follows:
TCj = FCj + VCj = FCj + a1 ∗  Ej + a2 ∗   Ej
2 (11)
where FCj is the fixed costs, a1 is the vertical intercept of the marginal cost, and a2
is the slope of the marginal cost function.1
1 Both linear and non-linear specifications were examined. The non-linear form performed better than
the linear model. A quadratic form was chosen for the variable cost (VC) because this function was as-
sumed to exhibit convex U-shaped marginal and average cost curves.Economic Impact of the Ivorian Sardinella Fishery 35
The demand facing the industrial sector, defined as the net demand, is the differ-
ence between total demand and the artisanal sector’s supply. With the assumption of
exogenous supply, demand at the dockside is directly derived from processor de-
mand which reflects the primary demand by consumers; thus, current prices, deter-
mined by auctions at the dockside, depends upon landings and other factors that are
important in the sardinella markets. Consequently, ex-vessel prices of species i are
hypothesized to be a function of own landings of species i, Qit, landings of related
species, Qit, landings of species i by the artisanal fishermen, Qiat, frozen imported
fish, Qmt, price of substitutes, e.g., meat and poultry, Pst, and error term, U:
Pit = f(Qit, Qut, Qiat, Qmt, Pst, U) (12)
For estimation, sardinella are divided into three species: Sardinella aurita,
Sardinella maderensis and Brachydeuterus auritus. Monthly data from 1981 to 1986
(CRO 1981–1986), are used in analyses with Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regres-
sion techniques.
The Optimization Model
The decision variables are Nj (number of vessels) and NTj (fishing trips by vessels).
There are two vessel classes (j = 1, 2 where 1 is for the small vessels and 2 for the
large vessels) and three species (1 = Sardinella aurita, 2 = Sardinella maderensis
and 3 = Brachydeuterus auritus).
The objective function for the model is:















subject to the following constraints:
The limits on vessel productivity
NTjt ≤   NTjt
max (14)
The limits on vessel harvesting capacity








The state equations for stocks
Bc+1it+1 = Bcit ∗  e(Gcit–Mi–Fcit+1) (16)
and demand equations
Pit = P(Qit, Qut) (17)
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Pit is the real price per kilo of species i in year t (1980 CFA).
qij is the catchability coefficient of species i by vessel class j.
TLjt is the time spent during a trip taken by a vessel in class j in year t.
Bit is the fishable biomass of species i in year t.
Qit are the landings of species i in year t (tons).
Qt* is the quota allocated per trip and per vessel in year t (tons).
Qut are the landings of related species in year t.
NTjt is the number of trips taken by a vessel in class j in year t.
NTjt
max is the maximum number of trips a vessel in class j can take in year t.
Gcit is the growth rate of year class at age (c = 1-4) of species i in year t.
Mi is the natural mortality of species i.
Fcit is the fishing mortality applied to the cth age-class of species i in year t.
TCjt is the total cost of effort by vessels in class j in year t.
ρ s
t  is the syndicate discount factor in year t.
Results
Results of the demand analysis for sardinella indicate statistically significant coeffi-
cients and theoretically expected signs on almost all of the right-hand-side variables
(table 1). Own landings and other landings, while having negative coefficients, were
statistically significant. Other related species and imports had generally mixed re-
sults with respect to statistical significance and expected signs. Imports, lagged
three months, were statistically significant and negative.
Four simulation models are used to assess the impacts of the syndicate manage-
Table 1
Estimates of Monthly Sardinella Demand Coefficients
Sardinella Sardinella Brachydeuterus
Variable aurita maderensis auritus
Intercept 150.885 182.455 153.578
(14.701) (14.957) (9.255)
S. aurita landings –0.00002474 –0.00002743 –0.00001722
(–9.390)* (–8.459)* (–5.102)*
S. maderensis landings –0.00002651 –0.00003620 –0.00000038
(–4.286)* (–4.497) (–0.049)






Other related species landings –0.00003908
(–1.658)**
R2 0.7079 0.6606 0.3101
D-W 2.0519 1.8192 1.8395
Note: The dependent variable is price. For the model development, it was assumed that the relationship
between ex-vessel price and frozen imports might be captured most realistically by a distributed lag.
Three month lags appeared to produce the best fit.
t-values are in parentheses below coefficients.
* significance at the 5% level (one-tail test).
** significance at the 10% level (one-tail test).Economic Impact of the Ivorian Sardinella Fishery 37
ment policy on the fleet and the social benefits attributed to the sardinella fishery.
The first model simulates fleet capacity, prices, and benefits on an annual basis for
25–40 years and compares it to the social optimum. The baseline simulation for the
syndicate represents the characteristics of the sardinella fleet during 1981–1986.
The social optimum is derived by maximizing the net benefit (consumer and pro-
ducer surplus) from the fishery. The results of the simulation are indicated in table
2. First, the number of vessels operated by the syndicate is less than the social opti-
mum, resulting in fewer fishing trips by the fleet. Second, overall total landings by
the syndicate are 31% below the social optimum (24,036 tons vs. 34,973 tons). This
difference is due to the overconservation of the sardinella resources by the syndi-
cate. Landings of Sardinella aurita made up for most of the decline with a decrease
from 20,987 tons to 14,092 tons. Landings of Sardinella maderensis and
Brachydeuterus auritus decline less dramatically from 11,920 tons to 8,302 tons and
from 2,066 tons to 1,642 tons respectively. Third, the average price charged by the
syndicate for the three species is 27% higher (104 CFA2/kg vs. 82 CFA/kg).
Sardinella aurita average price increases from 71 CFA/kg to 95 CFA/kg or 33.8% of
the social price. Sardinella mederensis and Brachydeuterus auritus increase by 33%
and 12% respectively.
Table 2
Comparison of Social Optimum with Syndicate for Important Variables























Note: The mean values reported with sample standard deviations in parentheses.
Q1 = Landings of S. aurita, Q2 = Landings of S. maderensis, Q3 = Landings of B. auritus, Qa1 = Artisanal
landings of S. aurita, Qa2 = Artisanal landings of S. maderensis, Qa3 = Artisanal landings of B. auritus,
P1 = Ex-vessel price of S. aurita, P2 = Ex-vessel price of S. maderensis, P3 = Ex-vessel price of B.
auritus, N1 = Fleet size of small vessels, N2 = Fleet size of large vessels E1 = Trips taken by a small ves-
sel, E2 = Trips taken by a large vessel, SOCBEN = Social benefits.
* Million FCFA.
2 Convention Financière Africaine (CFA).Diaby 38
Finally, the social benefits from the exploitation of the sardinella resources by
the syndicate are less than the social benefits under the social optimum. The differ-
ence between the two results is 466 million CFA or 17% of the social benefits under
the social optimum.
The objective of the second simulation is to determine the impacts of cycles in
recruitment on the two previous models. The structure of the recruitment cycle is as-
sumed to follow the observed patterns in the historical data. According to Bernacsek
(1986), cyclic peaks in landings of Sardinella aurita occur at about a three to six
year interval. However, since there is no available information on the two other spe-
cies, it is assumed that they also exhibit cyclic peaks at three to six year intervals.
Under these specifications, six year cycles were introduced into the baseline
models by adding harmonic terms to recruitment. A comparison of the syndicate and
the social optimum for six year cycle models is presented in table 3. While overall
total landings by the syndicate peak at 32% and reach minimum at 30% below the
social optimum (25,984 tons vs. 37,954 tons and 21,336 tons vs. 30,680 tons), social
benefits are 15% and 17% below their peak and minimum values respectively. Over-
all, the differences between the peak values or the minimum values are within
ranges observed for the baseline models without cycles.
Obviously these results are dependent on the parameter values used in both
models. Introducing discount rates in the models has not only little effect on the nu-
merical results, but also on the behavior of the syndicate relative to the social opti-
mum. The models are calculated for discounted rates of 0.10 and 0.15 for the syndi-
cate and 0.10 for the social optimum (table 4). For example, when both discount
rates are equal, landings by the syndicate are still low, implying that the syndicate
over-conserves the resource. But, on the other hand, when the social discount rate is
less than the syndicate discount rate, landings by the syndicate are larger than those
of the social optimum. As a result, the syndicate over-exploits the resource. In order
for the syndicate to be close to the social optimum, a higher discount rate has to be
used, which is unlikely to happen.
These results clearly demonstrate that management of the sardinella fishery is
not socially optimal.
Table 3
Comparison of Minimum, Baseline, and Maximum Values of Main Variables
for the Syndicate and Social Optimum with a Six Year Cycle Model
Variables Syndicate Social Optimum
Minimum Baseline Maximum Minimum Baseline Maximum
Q1 12,513 14,092 15,219 18,460 20,987 22,692
Q2 7,351 8,302 8,995 10,418 11,920 12,989
Q3 1,472 1,642 1,770 1,802 2,066 2,273
P1 90 96 101 64 71 80
P2 108 113 121 77 85 96
P3 101 103 106 88 91 96
N1 13 13 14 14 16 18
N2 555789
E1 127 130 134 160 160 160
E2 98 101 104 160 160 160
SOCBEN* 2,098 2,348 2,526 2,513 2,814 2,970
Note: The values reported are simple averages.
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Table 4
Baseline Results for Syndicate and Social Optimum with Discount Rates
Syndicate Baseline Results:  β  = 0.10
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 E1 E2 Socben*
1 13,767.27 8,122.12 1,615.15 95.82 114.77 103.34 13.14 4.82 129.23 100.11 2,113
2 14,133.20 8,329.03 1,652.49 94.47 114.16 102.66 13.43 4.93 130.51 101.12 1,944
3 14,125.10 8,320.89 1,646.92 94.53 113.23 102.70 13.44 4.94 130.55 101.15 1,766
4 14,123.97 8,319.52 1,644.76 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 1,605
5 14,123.88 8,319.42 1,644.66 94.54 113.25 102.71 13.45 4.94 130.56 101.16 1,459
6 14,123.86 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 1,326
7 14,123.87 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 1,206
8 14,123.88 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 1,096
9 14,123.87 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 996
10 14,123.86 8,319.40 1,644.64 94.54 113.25 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 905
11 14,123.86 8,319.42 1,644.64 94.54 113.25 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 823
12 14,123.86 8,319.40 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 748
13 14,123.87 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.25 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 680
14 14,123.87 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.15 618
15 14,123.86 8,319.40 1,644.63 94.54 113.25 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 562
16 14,123.89 8,319.42 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 511
17 14,123.87 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 465
18 14,123.88 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 423
19 14,123.85 8,319.40 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 384
20 14,123.91 8,319.43 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 349
21 14,123.87 8,319.41 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 318
22 14,123.88 8,319.42 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 289
23 14,123.91 8,319.43 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 262
24 14,123.86 8,319.40 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.16 239
25 14,123.89 8,319.42 1,644.64 94.54 113.24 102.71 13.44 4.94 130.56 101.15 217
Syndicate Baseline Results:  β  = 0.15
1 13,783.35 8,131.04 1,615.49 95.76 114.70 103.31 13.16 4.82 129.29 100.17 2,022
2 14,147.04 8,336.65 1,653.58 94.42 113.10 102.63 13.44 4.93 130.56 101.16 1,779
3 14,138.99 8,328.56 1,648.04 94.47 113.16 102.67 13.45 4.94 130.60 101.19 1,545
4 14,137.88 8,327.20 1,645.89 94.48 113.18 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.60 101.19 1,344
5 14,137.79 8,327.10 1,645.79 94.49 113.18 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.19 1,169
6 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 1,013
7 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 883
8 14,137.78 8,327.08 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 768
9 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 668
10 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,647.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 581
11 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 505
12 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 439
13 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 382
14 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.77 94.50 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 332
15 14,137.77 8,327.08 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 289
16 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 251
17 14,137.77 8,327.08 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 218
18 14,137.77 8,327.08 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 190
19 14,137.77 8,327.08 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 165
20 14,137.78 8,327.09 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 144
21 14,137.77 8,327.08 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 125
22 14,137.77 8,327.08 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 109
23 14,137.75 8,327.07 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 94
24 14,137.72 8,327.06 1,645.77 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 82
25 14,137.85 8,327.13 1,645.78 94.49 113.19 102.68 13.46 4.94 130.61 101.20 71Diaby 40
To approximate the effects of competition from the artisanal sector, the baseline
simulation was expanded and run under various levels of artisanal fishing mortality
of 1%, 3%, and 5%. The results of these simulations are presented in table 5. In or-
der to expand the model, assumptions were made with regard to the variables. Since
there is no accurate information available concerning the artisanal sector, predic-
tions about the expansion of the sector were calculated as follows. Assuming that
the expansion is uniform each year, fishing mortalities applied by the artisanal sec-
tor are assumed to grow at the rate of 1% per year. These mortalities are assumed to
be 0.10, 0.022, and 0.20, respectively, for Sardinella aurita, Sardinella maderensis
and Brachydeuterus auritus. These numbers are somewhat arbitrary, but they serve
to highlight the impacts of competition from the artisanal sector of the fishing in-
dustry. It is next assumed that the syndicate takes the artisanal landings as given and
its demand is affected by the artisanal landings. These two effects are introduced
into the model as follows: fishing mortalities in the stock equations (16) and total
landings (syndicate and artisanal) in the demand equations (17).
Effects of changing the assumed fishing mortality from 1% to 3% are signifi-
cant. As the artisanal fishing mortality increases, the average landings by the syndi-
cate decreases, while artisanal landings increase. The simulation results also indi-
cate that the total fleet size and the number of trips decrease moderately from the
current levels. Net revenue for the syndicate is expected to decrease and thus, so
does producer surplus. While competition from the artisanal sector would increase
consumer surplus, the gains would not exceed any loss to the syndicate as a whole,
indicating a decrease in social benefits. However, the increase in consumer surplus
entailed in the competition from an expanded artisanal sector may justify the change
of the syndicate management to a regulated competitive fishery.
Table 4 (continued)
Social Optimum Baseline Results:  δ  = 0.10
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 E1 E2 Socben*
1 20,269.84 11,565.00 2,035.78 73.24 87.87 92.24 15.29 7.80 160.00 160.00 2,293
2 20,409.46 11,637.84 2,046.04 72.75 87.30 92.00 15.44 7.88 160.00 160.00 1,870
3 20,050.78 11,447.96 2,016.74 74.02 88.80 92.63 15.05 7.69 160.00 160.00 1,520
4 19,706.07 11,272.64 1,996.68 75.19 90.20 93.21 14.64 7.49 160.00 160.00 1,236
5 19,357.45 11,095.78 1,979.39 76.37 91.60 93.79 14.22 7.29 160.00 160.00 1,004
6 19,001.80 10,914.21 1,961.17 77.57 93.03 94.37 13.80 7.08 160.00 160.00 815
7 18,638.93 10,727.67 1,941.75 78.80 94.50 94.98 13.38 6.88 160.00 160.00 660
8 18,269.98 10,536.19 1,921.08 80.06 96.00 95.60 12.97 6.68 160.00 160.00 534
9 17,892.19 10,339.86 1,899.12 81.36 97.54 96.23 12.55 6.49 160.00 160.00 432
10 17,508.84 10,138.81 1,875.88 82.68 99.11 96.88 12.14 6.29 160.00 160.00 348
11 17,119.26 9,933.21 1,851.34 84.03 100.72 97.54 11.90 5.91 160.00 160.00 305
12 16,723.85 9,723.24 1,825.51 85.40 102.36 98.22 11.33 5.73 160.00 160.00 281
13 16,323.09 9,509.16 1,798.39 86.80 104.02 98.90 10.93 5.54 160.00 160.00 226
14 15,917.48 9,291.21 1,770.00 88.23 105.72 99.61 10.53 5.37 160.00 160.00 181
15 15,507.65 9,069.75 1,740.38 89.67 107.44 100.32 10.13 5.19 160.00 160.00 145
16 15,094.28 8,845.14 1,709.55 91.14 109.19 101.04 9.74 5.02 160.00 160.00 116
17 14,678.15 8,617.81 1,677.58 92.62 110.95 101.77 9.35 4.85 160.00 160.00 92
18 14,260.11 8,388.25 1,644.52 94.11 112.73 102.51 8.97 4.69 160.00 160.00 73
19 13,841.15 8,157.01 1,616.45 95.61 114.52 103.25 8.59 4.53 160.00 160.00 58
20 13,422.30 7,924.71 1,575.47 97.12 116.31 104.00 8.22 4.38 160.00 160.00 46
21 13,004.76 7,692.04 1,539.70 98.63 118.11 104.75 7.85 4.24 160.00 160.00 36
22 12,589.78 7,459.73 1,503.27 100.14 119.90 105.50 7.50 4.09 160.00 160.00 28
23 12,178.76 7,228.63 1,466.33 101.63 121.69 106.24 7.15 4.09 160.00 160.00 22
24 11,773.15 6,999.60 1,429.04 103.11 123.45 106.98 6.80 3.96 160.00 160.00 17
25 11,382.35 6,778.13 1,392.47 104.55 125.16 107.69 6.49 3.83 160.00 160.00 13Economic Impact of the Ivorian Sardinella Fishery 41
Summary
Results from the simulation model suggest that management of the sardinella fishery
under the current fleet structure is not socially optimal. Under cyclic conditions, the
evolution of landings reflects the fluctuation in availability due to recruitment that is
affected by the environmental factors. The model also indicates that competition
from and expansion of the artisanal sector is likely to benefit consumers rather than
producers.
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